As established in the introductory chapter, this book offers original perspectives that are informed and inspired by the philosophy of technology, media theory, and the design of videogames. According to the general, postphenomenological approach that will be articulated from this chapter onwards, the interaction with virtual worlds (the way we experience them as beings in those worlds), as well as the very crafting of those artificial worlds (the way in which we relate to them as designers and creators), are recognized as activities capable of affecting our cognitive, critical, and operational capabilities. As such, reflecting on the experience and design of the virtual worlds of videogames and digital simulations cannot be treated as anything but a deeply philosophical task.
In order to explain the ways in which virtual worlds affect us and can be understood as philosophical artifacts, this chapter temporarily sets aside discussions concerning specific topics of philosophy of technology or media theory. Instead, it focuses more closely on the general ways of framing our relationships with technology, on the possibilities disclosed by the technical augmentation of human beings, and on an initial exploration of the effects of technical mediation on the development of thought throughout the history of Western philosophy. The objective of this chapter is to reflect on how technologies can assist and accompany us in overcoming what Heidegger called "the metaphysical heritage of thought." In pursuing this purpose, the next section clarifies what the term metaphysics indicates in the context of this book.
Meta-metaphysics
In the first century BC, the peripatetic philosopher Andronicus of Rhodes edited and arranged the writings of Aristotle. In his arrangement, he 2 A Reflection on Metaphysical Thought and Its Technological "Overcoming" coined the term metaphysics as a bibliographic coordinate to indicate the group of books dealing with "First Philosophy," which Andronicus placed after ( μετά-meta ) those dedicated to the study of the general properties of nature ( φύσις -physis ).
1 Aristotle characterized his "First Philosophy" as the study of "being qua being" (the understanding of being as such, the primary and most fundamental form of knowledge) ( Metaphysics , VI, 1026 a, 31) . Although very basic, this description captured a central aspect of the traditional understanding of metaphysics, that of its aspiration toward a form of knowledge that is independent from empirical observation and universally applicable. In the Aristotelian "First Philosophy," the study of natural theology, universal science, and "being" ("meant in many ways," as specified in the seventh book of his Metaphysics ) is explicitly performed at the level of their general and ubiquitous features.
The philosophical effort contained in Aristotle's Metaphysics can be read as an attempt to reconcile Plato's Theory of Forms (to which he was exposed during his years at the Academy in Athens) with the worldviews of the natural philosophy of Greece's Classical period. Interpreted in that historical perspective, it should not be surprising to observe that Aristotle undertook, in the original organization of his "First Philosophy" a broad variety of topics with very diverse levels of abstraction, from speculations on cosmogony and theology (in the books Epsilon and Lambda ) to the practical study of motion and the properties of natural elements (in Kappa ).
In the "First Philosophy" section of Aristotle's texts, for the first time in the history of written thought, one of the fundamental questions of traditional metaphysics, that of mind-dependency of knowledge, received its explicit formulation. The mind-dependency problem can be briskly formulated as: to what extent does knowledge depend on the qualities and possibilities of a human's sensory and intellectual apparatus?
A concrete example might be helpful in clarifying the meaning of these questions. Bat's meat is a delicacy customarily consumed in the Philippines and in Papua New Guinea, but it is not generally considered an appetizing ingredient in other cultural and geographical contexts, including most Western societies. This incongruence in the perception of the culinary appeal of that specific flying mammal reveals its appetizing quality not as a property inherent in the roasted bat itself, but rather as one that resides in the subjective tastes and values of the peoples relating to it as an edible item. The intrinsic subjectivity of any sensory perception is commonly experienced by humans as they engage with the world and other human beings in their everyday lives.
